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This paper studies the presence of hours constraints on the UK labor market and its e®ect
on older workers labor supply, both at the extensive and the intensive margin. Using
panel data for the period 1991-2004, the results from a competing risks model show that
over-employed male workers can freely reduce working hours with their current employer
prior to full retirement. However, some over-employed women are observed to leave the
labor market early due to hours constraints. Despite the fact that hours constraints may
shorten working lives of older women, this paper presents some explorative results which
illustrate that increasing working hours °exibility does not seem to increase older workers
total labor supply as is often suggested.
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As in many other OECD countries, the UK labor market is ageing. By 2050, the percentage of
individuals aged 65 and older compared with the total working-age population (aged 20-64) will
rise to 47 percent from 27 percent in 2003 (OECD (2004)). This may exert pressure on public
¯nances and a potential shortage of labor resources. The e®ects of ageing on the labor market
can be mitigated if the trend towards early labor market exit of older workers can be reversed.
In order to understand how this can be achieved, this study examines the labor supply decision
and workplace restrictions that may limit either the intensive or extensive margins of older
workers' labor supply.
A key assumption in the majority of labor supply theory is that workers can choose any
number of working hours at a given wage. This implies that employers are indi®erent to the
number of hours their employees work. However, several studies have criticized this assumption
using both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence. Several explanations can be given
as to why the number of working hours is not only the choice of the worker, but may also
be in°uenced by the employer. First, the ¯rm may face ¯xed costs of employment, or costs
associated with the coordination of activities of workers who work di®erent numbers of hours
(see Hamermesh (1987) for an overview), and as a result the worker may face a lower bound
on weekly working hours. Second, hours constraints can also arise as features of lifetime em-
ployment contracts, in which the wage and the marginal productivity of the worker diverge.
The existence of such contracts can be explained by implicit contract-insurance models, agency
models and ¯rm-speci¯c human capital models (Kahn and Lang, 1992, 1995). Since wages
in implicit contracts are ¯xed to insure workers against demand °uctuations, workers in such
contracts prefer to work less hours at times when ¯rms experience high demand, while prefer-
ring to work more in times of reduced demand. According to the agency theory, workers can
be contracted in deferred payment schemes in order to deter worker malfeasance. Due to the
di®erence between the speci¯ed wage and the workers' marginal productivity, in such contracts
hours are constrained from below for junior workers and from above for senior workers. Al-
ternatively, in models with speci¯c human capital, contracts are speci¯ed in such a way as to
2decrease worker mobility in order to make speci¯c human capital investments being worthwhile.
In these contracts, hours are constrained from above for junior workers and from below for se-
nior workers. Finally, hours constraints can arise in the absence of perfect competition. If ¯rms
are monopsony hires of labor, they will negotiate a contract with relatively high working hours
and low wages. Then, workers may want to work less hours at the given wage (Naylor (2003)).
Such a situation may also arise if labor mobility is costly or if better alternative employment
opportunities are scarce. On the other hand, if workers have monopoly power, e.g. due to
union power, then the resulting contract may be characterized by relatively few hours and high
wages, and each individual worker may want to work more hours.
Recently, several studies have found empirical evidence of working hours constraints. Re-
strictions on working hours have been found for the UK, where 40 percent of all employed
workers prefer to work a di®erent number of hours and the majority of them would like to re-
duce working hours (Stewart and Swa±eld (1997); Boheim and Taylor (2004); Bryan (2007)).
Hours constraints have also been found in other countries, such as the US (Altonji and Paxson
(1986, 1988, 1992) , Charles and DeCicca (2007)), Germany (Wolf (1998)), and the Netherlands
(Euwals (2001)).
This paper focuses on the e®ects of hours constraints on the labor market position of older
workers in the UK. As workers age, they may prefer to reduce their number of working hours,
for example due to health constraints or care obligations. Consequently, one may expect to
observe a gradual drop in working hours before full retirement. However, Figure 1 illustrates
that such a gradual retirement process is not common in the UK: in general, a discrete drop
in hours is observed at the time of retirement. The number of usual working hours per week
drops by 5 hours for men in the years prior to retirement, while for women the drop is only
2 hours. This limited hours change may be explained by the institutional setting in the UK.
First, the de¯ned bene¯t occupational pensions (which covers about 54 percent of all employees;
OECD (2004)) discourages gradual retirement, because the pension bene¯t depends on ¯nal
salary (Meghir and Whitehouse (1997)). Second, until April 2006, there was a legal constraint
on drawing a pension while continuing to work for the same employer. As a result, workers
who belonged to an employer's pension in their existing job were less likely to shift into part-
3time work, but those who had a pension from a previous employer were actually three times
more likely to work part-time before retirement than those who had never participated in an
employer's pension scheme (Banks and Smith (2006)).
However, the retirement decision may also be a®ected by working hours constraints imposed
by the employer. A lower bound on the number of working hours may discourage older workers
from continuing to work longer, thereby resulting in a discrete drop in working hours where
older workers retire, and fall from working full-time to not working at all. This might well be
the case in the UK, where the proportion of older workers working more than 50 hours per week
is much higher, on average, than in other OECD countries (OECD (2006)). These long hours
may explain the large percentage of male workers who would like to work less hours and hence
are denoted over-employed (Figure 1). Possibly, due to a larger hours adjustment for males
than for females in the years preceding retirement, the proportion of over-employed women is
increasing as they approach retirement, while this proportion is more or less constant among
male workers (but remains at a higher level). The ¯gure suggests that working hours °exibility
may be e®ective in reducing the proportion of over-employment, thereby potentially reducing
labor market exit. Using HRS data, Penner et al. (2002) conclude that among older American
workers who left their job between 1992 and 2000 about 13% would have stayed in their job
if they could have reduced their number of working hours. In Sweden, about 7 percent of the
workers aged 50 years and above claim to have physical problems which restrict them from
continuing work in the present occupation until the o±cial retirement age, but that shortening
working hours would solve the problem (WadensjÄ o (2006)).
This paper examines how hours constraints a®ect the decision to continue working or to
leave the labor market. Charles and DeCicca (2007) consider hours constraints in the US
labor market and ¯nd that hours constrained workers' probability to retire is about 3 to 5
percentage points higher than that for unconstrained workers. However, it is quite likely that
working hours constraints a®ect the retirement decision only if workers have no alternatives
to changing working hours within the labor market. Using UK data, Boheim and Taylor
(2004) take into account other adjustment possibilities, such as a job change or promotion.
They ¯nd that workers are able to adjust working hours according to preferences, but this is
4greatly facilitated through within- and between-employer job changes. Additionally, they ¯nd
that hours constraints positively a®ect the probability to leave the labor market.1 This paper
focuses on older workers (aged 50 and older) in particular since older workers may have less
opportunities to change jobs and can more easily exit the labor force than prime-age workers.
These transitions out of the labor market are quite important, since in general older workers
leaving the labor force are not very likely to return due to limited hiring of older workers (Gielen
and van Ours (2006), OECD (2006)). This study contributes to the literature by investigating
the e®ect of over-employment on older workers labor supply, looking at both the participation
decision (i.e. extensive margin) and the total number of hours worked (i.e. intensive margin). A
related study for the US by Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) has found that increasing working
hours °exibility could lead to a signi¯cant extension of older workers' working lives, and that
the net change in e®ective labor supply would be smaller but is still positive.2 However, the US
labor market is quite distinct from the UK labor market in terms of labor market °exibility and
social security provisions. Furthermore, especially in the UK, the issue of °exible working hours
for older workers has received a lot of public attention, as it has been suggested as a policy
instrument to increase older workers' labor force participation and to reduce the large drop in
labor supply due to the early retirement of the baby boom generation (e.g. EFA (2001, 2002)).
The results are used to predict to what extent working lives can be prolonged by increasing
°exibility in working hours, and how this would a®ect total labor supply of older workers.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical model about the
labor market behavior of over-employed workers. The empirical model is presented in section
3. Section 4 describes the data and presents some stylized facts. In section 5 the results of the
empirical analysis are presented, which illustrate that hours constraints may a®ect the labor
participation decision of older workers if possibilities to adjust hours within the labor market
are relatively limited. Section 6 focuses attention on the e®ects of increased working hours
°exibility on total labor supply. Finally, section 7 provides a conclusion.
1Not necessarily retirement, since they focus on working-age individuals in general.
2Similar results have been found for Sweden by WadensjÄ o (2006), though this study uses information on the
abolishment of a gradual retirement scheme, rather than increasing hours °exibility, combined with participation
¯gures from the early 1980s, when early labor market exit of older workers was much more accepted than
nowadays.
52 Theoretical model
This section presents a simple life-cycle model which is based on Cremer et al. (2004) and
Sheshinksi (2006, 2007). Although the empirical analysis in this paper is based on a reduced
form speci¯cation, the model presented in this section serves to illustrate the labor supply
decision of older workers when faced with working hours constraints. In this model, older
workers are observed to participate in the labor market from age 50 (t = 0) until retirement at
age t = R. The maximum lifespan is T. Workers' preferences at age t can be represented by
an additive separable utility function de¯ned over consumption (c) and the number of hours
worked per week (l)3:
Ut = u(ct) ¡ etv(lt) (1)
where u0(c) > 0, u00(c) < 0, v0(l) > 0 and v00(l) > 0. The second term in equation (1) denotes
the disutility of labor. The ¯rst component (et) denotes the disutility associated with working
until age t, which is assumed to be nondecreasing with age (e0
t ¸ 0).4 The second component
denotes disutility associated with the length of the workweek (v(l)). When time-preference and
















which implies that total lifetime consumption equals total lifetime wage income.5
Maximizing lifetime utility (2) subject to the budget constraint (3) yields a constant optimal
consumption level equal to
3Though slightly di®erent from the prevailing life-cycle literature, this de¯nition is useful when hours con-
straints are introduced. Furthermore, it distinguishes this dimension of labor supply from choosing the optimal
retirement age R. Finally, a full-time work week is normalized to 1, which implies that 0 · l · 1.
4This disutility can be considered to be a discontinuous function at l ! 0 in order to provide an incentive
to retire. Such a discontinuity may arise for example from start-up costs.
5This model assumes zero pensions after the age of retirement for computational simplicity. However,








Hence, in this simpli¯ed model, the worker will set the level of consumption equal in all periods.6







It is evident that workers will work more hours for a higher wage, and if the disutility of
working at age t is lower. If the disutility of work were to increase with age (e.g. due to health
constraints) older workers would be expected to gradually reduce the number of hours worked
until the age at which they retire from the labor market. In addition to the number of hours
worked, labor supply of older workers is also determined by the age at which the worker decides
to retire from the labor market. The optimum retirement age (R¤) is de¯ned by
u
0(c
¤)wlR¤ = eR¤v(lR¤) (6)
where the marginal bene¯ts of postponing retirement by a small time period equal the marginal
costs of such a postponement.
The optimal choice for consumption and work may be a®ected by the presence of hours
constraints. Workers may face a lower bound on the number of weekly working hours. This
constraint limits the number of hours worked to be at least lc:
lt ¸ l
c (7)
Then, maximization of lifetime utility (2) subject to the budget constraint (3) and the hours
constraint (7) yields a slightly di®erent expression for l:





u0(c¤)w < etv0(lc) if l¤
t < lc (8)
6This results from the assumptions of time preference being equal to the interest rate, from the certain
lifetime, and from the additive separability of the utility function.
7Workers for whom the constraint in (7) is not binding will work their optimal number of working
hours (l¤
t). However, workers for whom the constraint does bind will work more hours than
they would prefer to. As a result, the marginal disutility of work is larger. This implies that at
the initial optimal retirement age R¤ for a given level of consumption the marginal costs of a
small postponement of retirement now exceed the marginal bene¯ts.7 As a result, the worker
could increase lifetime utility by lowering R, hence by choosing to retire earlier. The e®ects of
the hours constraint on labor supply are illustrated by a graphical example in Figure 2.8 The
top panel illustrates the (unconstrained) choice for the number of working hours l at a given
age t, which follows from equation (5). Since the disutility of working increases with age, the
number of hours worked gradually declines when workers get older. The lower panel illustrates
the retirement decision, where workers decide to retire as soon as the marginal costs of a small
postponement of retirement (denoted by the marginal costs (MC) per hour worked, etv(lt))=lt)
equal the marginal bene¯ts of a small postponement of retirement (denoted by the marginal
bene¯ts (MB) per hour worked, u0(c¤)w).9 Hence, workers work l¤ hours per week until they
retire at age R¤. When workers face a lower bound on the number of working hours (denoted
by lc), marginal disutility of work increases. As a result, the marginal costs function in the
lower panel rotates to the left, which causes the optimal retirement age to fall to Rc. The ¯gure
thus illustrates that hours constrained workers work more hours than they prefer for Rc ¡ tc
years, but retire R¤ ¡ Rc years earlier than unconstrained workers.10 The net e®ect of hours
constraints on total hours worked over the lifetime depends on whether the additional number
of hours worked while being over-employed (area ABC) exceeds the number of hours lost due
to early retirement (area CDEF).
7Note that R¤ refers to the optimal retirement age if the worker were to be unconstrained in his choice of l.
8The following functions are used in the simulation: et = 0:75t® with ® = 0:8, and v(lt) = 1=(1 ¡ lt)2. For
u(c) no speci¯c function is assumed, since the optimal level of consumption is constant over time.
9Note that from equation (4) and (6) it appears that the marginal bene¯t of each additional hour worked is
constant, since u0(c¤)w is constant over time.
10Note that workers may decide to change jobs in order to lose the hours constraint. However, labor mobility
is costly. Though the decision to change jobs is not being modelled here, one may argue that a worker may
decide to change jobs as long as the mobility costs are smaller than the increase in disutility of labor imposed
by the hours constraint.
8Overall, the message from the theoretical model is that hours constraints a®ect labor supply
of older workers across two dimensions. First, workers are over-employed in that they work
more hours than they would prefer for several periods. Second, hours constraints give rise to
early retirement of workers. In the analysis below, an investigation is carried out into what
extent empirical evidence for this can be found.
3 Empirical model
The ¯rst part of the empirical analysis considers the e®ect of working hours constraints on the
labor market participation decision of older workers. The length of older workers' working lives
is investigated by estimating the duration in employment after the age of 50. Workers may
leave the labor force either by retiring or by entering inactivity, which includes, for example,
unemployment, disability, and other forms of inactivity. However, rather than leaving the
labor force, over-employed workers may be able to reduce working hours with their current
employer or by changing employers. Alternatively, workers may choose to change employers
without reducing working hours if, for example, longer working hours are compensated for by a
higher wage or fringe bene¯ts, such that the utility of the new job exceeds the utility received
from the current job. If workers have these options available to them, the desire to leave the
labor force early may be reduced. Therefore, employment duration is modelled in a competing
risks framework, where the transition of leaving the labor force is modelled, but where people
can also make a transition within the labor market. Hence, a distinction is made between
5 separate destination states m, i.e. retirement, inactivity, hours reduction with the current
employer, and changing employers with and without reducing working hours, where the former
two are assumed to be absorbing states11, while the latter three states are not. If workers
change employers or reduce working hours with the current employer, they are continued to
be observed in employment until they leave the labor force. Standard errors are corrected
11Continued employment in the current job without reducing working hours is de¯ned as the reference state.
Furthermore, re-entry is not modelled. Due to this restriction, the duration in the labor force is under-estimated,
since 22 percent of the people who leave the labor force are observed to re-enter the labor market, either via
unretirement (10% of all retirees) or by leaving inactivity (32% of all inactive people). In section 5 this issue is
dealt with by applying several speci¯cations for labor market exit.
9for observing multiple spells for some individuals by using the Huber Sandwich estimator (see
Huber (1967) and White (1980)), which treats multiple spells for the same individual as being
from the same cluster.
The model is estimated using a reduced-form approach, which provides a °exible dynamic
structure to estimate the transition process.12 Even though survival occurs in continuous time,
a discrete time competing risks model is estimated, because spell lengths are observed only in
intervals. Since the data is subject to (exogenous) right censoring, an exit is not observed for
each worker.13 Though these censored observations are included in the analysis, they provide
no information for estimating the hazard rate. Furthermore, the data are subject to left trunca-
tion, which occurs when some of the spell starting dates are not observed. This causes a sample
selection problem where the selection e®ect depends on survival time itself, since necessarily
any individual whose employment spell ended before the age of 50 (and who did not return to
employment before the age of 50) is excluded from the sample. In the analysis, left truncation
is dealt with by modifying the density to re°ect the fact that part of the population is system-
atically omitted from the sample (Wooldridge (2002)), i.e. by conditioning upon survival up
to the truncation date (age of 50).14 Then, the discrete time hazard into one of the m states
is equal to the probability of making a transition in interval t, conditional upon survival up
to the beginning of the interval. It is assumed that the conditional destination-speci¯c hazard





















12Alternatively, one may choose to estimate a dynamic programming model. However, the reduced-form
approach is very useful for describing the actual data, without having to impose strong assumptions about
functional form which are needed when using a dynamic programming approach.
13Attrition is assumed to be random, based on (Buck et al. (2006)), who show that the composition of the later
cross-sections (wave 5 and wave 13) does not di®er much from the composition of wave 1. Although Crouchley
and Oskrochi (2001) conclude that attrition cannot be ignored, they add that information on a yearly basis (as
in BHPS) is insu±cient to identify the nature of the attrition process accurately, since much can happen in a
year.
14Initial conditions are not explicitly modelled, though some attention will be paid to this in the next section.
10where Xit includes both time-variant and time-varying individual characteristics and ±m mea-
sures the e®ect of over-employment (Zit) on the exit probability to state m. The rate at which
workers become over-employed is assumed to be independent of the process that drives worker
mobility, conditional on individual characteristics.15 The baseline hazard (µm
t ) is modelled us-
ing a piecewise constant speci¯cation. In this non-parametric approach, duration dependence









Here, Ist are time-varying dummy variables to represent each time interval at risk. For males,
eight time intervals are distinguished: 1 year, 2-3 years, 4-5 years, 6-7 years, 8-9 years, 10-11
years, 12-13 years, and 14-15 years.16 Note that these time intervals correspond to age intervals
51, 52-53, ..., 63-64. For women, only 6 time intervals are distinguished, where the last interval
denotes a duration of 10 years (i.e. age 59).17 Since an intercept term is also estimated, #m
1 is
normalized to zero.
For the given hazard rate, the individual workers' likelihood contribution has the same form



































1 if cit = m
0 if cit = 0
15This assumption is tested in section 5.
16Two-years intervals are used because duration dependence could not be estimated for one-year intervals due
to lack of data.
17Note that the normal retirement age is 65 for men and 60 for women during the sample period.
18Note that it is assumed here that the hazard is constant within each yearly interval. This assumption is
needed since the observations are interval-censored over a period of a year.
11where cm is a destination-speci¯c censoring indicator, which equals 1 if worker i exits to state m
in interval t, and h0 is the conditional probability of making no transition (reference category).
In order to account for unobserved components a®ecting the mobility decision, the model
can be enriched by controlling for unobserved worker characteristics, which are modelled using a
non-parametric mass points approach (Heckman and Singer (1984)). The unknown distribution
of the unobserved heterogeneity term is approximated by a multivariate discrete distribution
whose points of support, which can be interpreted as the (estimated) ¯xed e®ect for each group
of individuals (r) that shares a certain unobserved propensity (ceteris paribus) for making a
certain transition, and the corresponding probabilities (¼r), which is the probability that some-
one belongs to group r, are modelled by a multinomial logit speci¯cation and estimated jointly
with the other parameters of the model.19 Then, the conditional hazard rate for individual i



























¼r = 1 (13)
4 Data and stylized facts
4.1 Data
In this paper data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is used for the period 1991-
2004.20 Initially, each year a representative sample of 10,000 individuals from 5,500 households
was collected. As of 1999 households in Wales, Scotland and later Northern Ireland were
19In total, three points of support (R = 3) are included. The likelihood was not signi¯cantly improved when
more mass points were added. Furthermore, the results are unlikely to be sensitive to the choice of a discrete
distribution for unobserved heterogeneity (for example, as opposed to a continuous distribution), as discrete
distributions have been shown to be su±ciently °exible to capture random e®ects unobserved heterogeneity
(Van den Berg (2001)).
20Unless otherwise indicated, the ¯gures and tables in this paper are based on the BHPS data.
12added, which caused the yearly sample size to increase to approximately 16,000 individuals
from 9,000 households. The dataset contains extensive information on both the individual and
the household level, such as individual and spousal actual working hours, labor market position
and transitions, and individual and household income characteristics.
The analysis focuses on workers between 50 and the statutory pension age (65 for males and
60 for females) who are employed at the age of 50. The age of 50 is chosen as the lower limit,
since retirements are observed in the data as of the age of 50. Some individuals enter the survey
after the age of 50. Using retrospective work-history information, one can determine whether
someone was employed at the age of 50. However, 15 percent of the individuals are denoted
as 'delayed entrant', since retrospective work-history information was missing or because they
experienced non-employment spells between the age of 50 and the age at which they entered
the survey. These delayed entrants are excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, employment
spells extending beyond the statutory pension age are censored.
An important aspect for this study is the information the data provide about the worker's
preference on working hours: `Thinking about the hours you work, assuming that you would
be paid the same amount per hour, would you prefer to work fewer hours (1), more hours
(2), or continue with the same number of hours? (3).' Workers who report preferring to work
less hours are de¯ned as over-employed. Workers are denoted unconstrained if they prefer to
continue to work the same number of hours.21 Furthermore, the data contains self-reported
information about working hours satisfaction (scaled 1-7, ranging from `not satis¯ed at all' (1)
to `completely satis¯ed' (7)). This information is used to indicate whether people prefer small
or large working hours adjustments. Self-employed were excluded from the analysis, since they
are expected to be more free to determine their number of working hours. Table 1 provides some
sample means. Furthermore, the table illustrates the characteristics of over-employed workers
compared to those of unconstrained workers. It appears that over-employment is associated
with more hours of work and lower monthly non-labor income. Furthermore, over-employed
workers are more often employed in temporary jobs. Finally, workers who are a member of
21People who prefer to work more hours are included in this group, since this occurs very rarely among older
workers (about 4 percent of all workers).
13an employer pension scheme are associated with more over-employment. Possibly, the de¯ned
bene¯t character of these schemes discourages gradual hours reductions.
4.2 Stylized facts
To illustrate the severity of being hours constrained, Table 2 presents a transition matrix.
The table indicates that almost a quarter of over-employed male workers are able to become
unconstrained in the following period with the current employer, possibly by means of an hours
reduction. About 3 percent become unconstrained by changing employers. Hours constraints
do not seem to a®ect the °ow to retirement for males: the proportion of over-employed male
workers that enter retirement is actually smaller than the proportion of unconstrained workers.
However, the opposite is true for women. Over-employed female workers are more likely to
retire than unconstrained women. This may be due to the fact that over-employed women are
less likely than men to become unconstrained with their current employer and that they have
to rely more on employer changes, which is rather di±cult for older workers (see for example
Gielen and van Ours (2006)).
Table 3 shows that hours reductions associated with employer changes are larger than those
that occur with the current employer. This is suggestive evidence of hours constraints within
jobs. When looking at the average age of exit, over-employed workers are found to retire one
year earlier on average than unconstrained workers. This suggests that increased working hours
°exibility may be associated with longer working lives of older workers.
In order to see whether over-employment indeed shortens working lives of older workers, the
hazard rate to retirement is illustrated in Figure 3. For over-employed women, the hazard rate
to retirement is higher than for other working females. This suggests that a lack of °exibility
on the intensive margin may have an e®ect on labor supply at the extensive margin for women.
This relationship does not appear to hold for males. The exit to inactivity is not used as an
early exit by over-employed workers, according to Figure 4. Hence, over-employed seem to
leave the labor force earlier only via retirement. Figures 5 to 7 show the hazard to within-
employment mobility. Over-employed women (and to a lesser extent also men) are more likely
to reduce working hours either with the current employer or between employers. This suggests
14that workers do try to adjust hours within the labor market. If this is not possible, they may
resort to retirement.
5 Empirical results
Since workers may either choose to adjust working hours inside the labor market or outside,
a competing risks model is estimated, as described earlier. The transition model can be inter-
preted as a reduced form of an intertemporal utility comparison. The worker will choose the
exit which yields him the highest lifetime utility. Hours reduction with the current employer is
de¯ned as a reduction in usual working hours excluding overtime hours.22 Table 4 presents the
estimation results for the competing risks model for males.23 From the baseline model it ap-
pears that over-employed men are able to reduce working hours with their current employer.24
Possibly, this °exibility causes over-employment to have no e®ect on the hazard into retirement
for males. Furthermore, the ¯ndings indicate that labor demand considerations play a role. The
higher the local unemployment rate, the more likely older male workers are to enter inactivity.
Overtime workers are less likely to reduce (usual) working hours with the current employer,
possibly because they can reduce overtime hours as a means to respond to over-employment.
If, on the other hand, overtime hours are part of the job, overtime workers are found to change
employers to achieve a reduction in working hours. Moreover, workers are less likely to retire
if their partner is also still employed.25 Institutions also matter. Workers who are a member
22Additionally, paid overtime hours are not allowed to increase, so as to avoid having workers trading usual
working hours for paid overtime hours. Furthermore, as part of a sensitivity analysis to correct for measurement
error, usual hours are required to be reduced by at least 2 hours. The results remained unchanged.
23Labor market experience is excluded from the set of covariates (and is replaced by age and education level),
since it would reduce the number of observations by one third. Moreover, the usual number of hours worked
is excluded, since this may be endogenous. In order to correct for whether or not there is 'space' to adjust
hours, a dummy variable for part-time work is included. However, results remain unchanged if these variables
are included.
24Note that the e®ect of over-employment can only be identi¯ed properly when the `no-anticipation' assump-
tion holds (Abbring and Van den Berg (2003)). In this study it seems a reasonable assumption that anticipation
e®ects cannot be of great signi¯cance, because shocks that a®ect the preference for working hours (such as health
shocks or changes in labor market status of the spouse), and hence the probability to become over-employed
appear rather unexpectedly. Furthermore, because of the data being collected over one-year intervals, the pres-
ence of anticipation shortly before the time the actual hours constraint arises would not bias the estimates as
long as the anticipation occurs within the yearly interval.
25There is a stream of literature which emphasizes that retirement is a joint decision of both the individual
and the spouse due to complementarity of leisure (see for example Blau and Riphahn (1999) and Michaud
15of an employer pension scheme are more likely to retire completely and less likely to reduce
working hours. This may be due to the de¯ned bene¯t character of the occupational pension
schemes. Finally, the baseline hazard to retirement shows a pattern of positive duration de-
pendence, while for the other exits no particular pattern in duration dependence is found. The
results for women are presented in Table 5. For over-employed women the opportunities to
reduce working hours with the current employer seem to be rather limited, so they may have
to rely on employer changes in order to reduce working hours. Possibly, since changing jobs
can be very di±cult for older workers, subsequent years of over-employment may cause the
worker to reach the optimal number of lifetime labor supply, and therefore she may choose to
retire. Furthermore, the higher the local unemployment rate, the more reluctant women are
to change their current labor market position. Being in good health increases the probability
of continued employment. In panel B of both tables, the analyses correct for unobserved het-
erogeneity by introducing three classes within which workers are related by a latent common
factor.26 Unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be perfectly correlated between the separate
exits. A likelihood ratio (LR) test would indicate that including unobserved heterogeneity in
the model signi¯cantly improves the model ¯t.27 Note however that a formal LR-test cannot
be applied because one of the parameters is not identi¯ed in the model without unobserved
heterogeneity. As panels A and B of Tables 4 and 5 illustrate, the results for over-employment
do not di®er much from the baseline model.28
A potential problem with the previous results concerns the assumption that the incidence
of over-employment is exogenous, while an endogenous selection mechanism may exist which
causes individuals to experience over-employment. That is, the over-employment process may
be a®ected by unobservable worker characteristics which also a®ect the hazard rate, e.g. work-
ers with a high latent retirement probability may have already sorted into jobs with hours
(2003)). Since it is not the main purpose of this study to model joint decision making, only the single decision
of the individual worker is considered, but the number of hours worked by the spouse is included as a regressor.
26Table A4.1 in the Appendix provides information on the size and characteristics of the separate classes.
27The model without unobserved heterogeneity is nested in the speci¯cation with unobserved heterogeneity
and follows from the restriction that ¯m
0r = ¯m
0r0 for all r 6= r0.
28Since the results appear to be very robust, both without unobserved heterogeneity and with perfectly
correlated unobserved heterogeneity, imperfect correlation in unobserved heterogeneity is not modelled as it is
unlikely to change the main results.
16constraints. If such selectivity exists and is not taken into account, the causal e®ect of over-
employment on leaving the labor market may be biased. To check whether there is an endoge-
nous selection in the incidence of over-employment, the models in panel B are re-estimated
where the estimated coe±cients for over-employment are allowed to vary between the three
unobserved heterogeneity classes. In this model, correlation between the unobserved character-
istics and over-employment a®ects the estimation results and one would expect to ¯nd di®erent
coe±cients for over-employment for each of the three classes. However, an LR-test indicates
that the estimates for the di®erent classes are not signi¯cantly di®erent. Furthermore, the
results remain more or less unchanged when correlation between the unobserved characteristics
and being over-employed is controlled for along the lines of Mundlak (1978). Hence, this sug-
gests that over-employment is unlikely to be endogenous. Unfortunately, the dataset provides
no good instruments to account properly for selectivity.
Until now the analyses have only looked at the dummy variable indicating whether someone
was over-employed or not. However, this dummy variable does not indicate whether workers
prefer a large change in working hours or just a small one. If the preferred change in hours is
rather small (say below a certain threshold level), people may decide not to respond to this at
all. Therefore, in panels C, information on hours satisfaction is included in the model. Here a
dummy variable is included for workers who report being over-employed, but still report being
satis¯ed with working hours, and a dummy for over-employed workers who are dissatis¯ed with
working hours.29 The results indeed indicate that there may be some threshold level after
which people start to respond to being over-employed. Dissatis¯ed over-employed males are
more likely to reduce working hours than workers who report being over-employed but still are
satis¯ed with the number of working hours. Some dissatis¯ed over-employed women are able
to reduce working hours with the employer, while others have to rely on changing employer
as a means to reduce working hours. Since there may be costs associated to changing jobs,
only women who prefer a large change in working hours may consider it worth the costs, while
women who prefer only a small change may consider retirement as an attractive alternative.
29An LR-test indicates that the inclusion of these dummy variables signi¯cantly improves the model ¯t
compared to the model in panel A for males, though for women it is only a marginal improvement.
17On the other hand, over-employment among women who are satis¯ed with their hours may also
represent a preference for retirement. Again, the results do not change much when correcting
for unobserved heterogeneity.30
In order to illustrate the magnitude of the over-employment e®ect, Table 6 presents some
marginal e®ects.31 Male workers who are over-employed and dissatis¯ed with working hours
only respond to over-employment by reducing hours with the current employer. In general,
these workers have a 5 percentage points higher probability of reducing working hours with the
current employer than unconstrained workers, though the e®ect is slightly smaller in the year
before the o±cial retirement age. This may be due to the e®ect of ¯nal wage on the pension
bene¯t. Female workers who are dissatis¯ed with working hours respond to over-employment
by changing employers rather than reducing hours with the current employer. Note that an
hours-reducing employer change only occurs among women aged 50 to 54. For older women near
retirement changing employers may not pay o® due to the costs associated with an employer
change. The potential lack of hours adjustment possibilities for over-employed women may
cause them to work more hours. Due to the disutility associated with work they may decide
to leave the labor force early. As the table illustrates, over-employed women between ages 50
and 54 are more likely to enter inactivity, while possibilities for early retirement increase at
later ages.32 Figure 8 presents the predicted survivor function, which indicates by how much
over-employment a®ects the timing of leaving the labor force.33 A distinction is made between
survival functions for several (hypothetical) situations: for workers who are not over-employed
at all during their working lives, and for workers who become over-employed at a certain age
(while reporting dissatisfaction with working hours) and remain over-employed after that.34 As
the ¯gure clearly illustrates, there is no di®erence in the timing of exit between male workers who
30Not presented in table; results are available from the author upon request.
31Marginal e®ects are evaluated at the mean of the covariates. For dummy variables, the marginal e®ect
represents the partial e®ect from a discrete (0 to 1) change.
32Marginal e®ects for satis¯ed and dissatis¯ed over-employment on retirement are not signi¯cantly di®erent
for women.
33From the estimation results, predicted hazard rates are obtained, which can be used to predict survival
functions.
34`Hypothetical' since over-employment varies frequently over time. Only 25 percent of all workers who are
over-employed at least once are over-employed for more than 3 successive years. On the other hand, about 40
percent of all workers are not over-employed at all during the observation period.
18are over-employed and those that are not over-employed, while over-employed female workers
seem to exit six months earlier than women who are not over-employed. While over-employed
women start to leave the labor market on average at the age of 58, women not over-employed
leave one year later at the age of 59.35 This suggests that the working lives of women who
leave the labor market early due to hours constraints can be prolonged by up to 12 months on
average if hours °exibility were to be increased.
Tables 7 and 8 report several sensitivity analyses to check for initial conditions which may
a®ect the relationship between over-employment and worker mobility.36 For example, some
workers may have sorted themselves in part-time jobs already, as they are in the middle of
the gradual retirement process. Since workers are expected to retire completely out of these
so-called `bridge jobs' ignoring this sorting could lead to the incorrect conclusion that hours
in°exibility leads to retirement, while actually it re°ects a preference for zero working hours.
Hence, the model has been re-estimated for workers who were employed full-time (i.e. working
at least 30 hours per week) at the time they are ¯rst observed in the sample. As the ¯rst esti-
mation in panel A shows, the results remain mostly unchanged. Related to this is the question
of whether the possibilities to adjust working hours depend on the number of hours worked in
the current contract. If working hours constraints are due to ¯xed costs of employment, some
minimum level of working hours (e.g. threshold level) may exist below which an individual
worker is no longer productive. It is obvious that individuals who work part-time are more
likely to pass this threshold. The second estimation in panel A of Table 8 investigates whether
hours constraints are more restrictive for women working part-time than for full-time work-
ers.37 The results suggest that hours constraints are not the result of some minimum hours
threshold, since actually women working part-time do respond to over-employment by reducing
working hours with their current employer or by changing employers, while women working
35These exit ages are relatively low since they also include the exit to inactivity. If only the exit to retirement
is considered, it is found that men retire at the age of 63, while unconstrained women retire at the age of 60
and over-employed women at 59. This is in line with Meadows (2003), who ¯nds an average retirement age in
the UK of 62.7 for men and 59.7 for women. Note that the average exit age is higher than was presented in
Table 3, due to correction for censored cases in the empirical model. Since no exit age for individuals with only
censored observations is observed, these were not included in the average presented in Table 3.
36Since the sensitivity results with and without unobserved heterogeneity are the same, only the results
without correcting for unobserved heterogeneity are presented.
37This distinction cannot be made for men due to a lack of men working part-time.
19full-time are not observed to reduce hours in either way. This may re°ect a di®erence between
women in a career job versus any other job. Possibly, women working full-time are in their
career job and are hesitant to look for bridge jobs since these may imply a job of lower quality.
Lissenburgh and Smeaton (2003) have found that older women are successful in ¯nding °exible
jobs, but often these jobs are of inferior quality (while men end up in relatively good °exible
jobs). Since women in their career job are likely to have accumulated savings and pension
entitlements, these women may choose to leave the labor market altogether rather than to take
up part-time employment in a low-quality job. A second type of sensitivity analysis addresses
the issue of re-entry. As was mentioned earlier, the previous estimations did not allow for
re-entry. However, the data illustrate that 22 percent of all workers who leave the labor force
are observed to re-enter some time later. In panel B, retirement and inactivity are rede¯ned
to spells that last at least two years. This limits labor force re-entry to just 0.3 percent of
the sample. As shown in panel B, the main ¯ndings remain unchanged. Though some over-
employed dissatis¯ed women are observed to reduce hours with the current employer now, the
e®ects on retirement and inactivity remain. Hence, the single spell model does not seem to be
too restrictive. Finally, there may be a relationship between tenure at age 50 (i.e. the trunca-
tion date) and being over-employed, which may a®ect the results. For example, highly mobile
workers (i.e. with short tenure) may be more likely to be over-employed. In panel C, the model
is re-estimated for workers with long tenure, 5 and 10 years respectively. Again, the results
are largely unchanged.38 Similarly, the results may be a®ected by an underlying relationship
between labor market experience, over-employment and turnover, e.g. low experience workers
may have some unobserved preferences for non-employment. Therefore, they may be more
likely to consider themselves over-employed and this may therefore a®ect turnover. As panel
C shows, the results are more or less unchanged. The results in Tables 7 and 8, and the few
di®erences in characteristics between over-employed and not over-employed (Table 1), suggest
that there is no need to model initial conditions separately and that it su±ces to correct for
selective sample selection due to left truncation, as was explained in section 3.
38In the last speci¯cation, several coe±cients drop in signi¯cance, which may be due to a drop in the number
of observations.
20The results from Tables 4 and 5 suggest that some over-employed women in their career job
may retire early, since they cannot adjust working hours as easily as men can. To check whether
leaving the labor force was indeed an involuntary choice for these women, this study investigates
whether workers who have left the labor force are willing to take up a new job or not.39 In other
words, if someone is really `pushed' out of the labor market, she should still want to work after
she has left the labor force. Table 9 provides the results from a probit model. It appears that
labor market exit via inactivity is often less voluntary than exit via retirement, as workers who
left to inactivity are more willing to take up a new job. For men, the over-employment status
at the time of labor market exit does not a®ect the job search or the willingness to take up
another job. This is in line with the results from Table 4, where it is found that over-employed
men are able to reduce working hours with the current employer very easily. Hence, males that
do retire probably do so because they prefer to leave the labor market. On the other hand,
the ¯nding is that women who were over-employed at the time of labor market exit are more
likely to prefer a new job than women who were not over-employed at the time of exit. This
suggests that unconstrained women deliberately choose to retire, while over-employed women
were `pushed' out of the labor market.40 Again, correcting for unobserved heterogeneity does
not change the results. Furthermore, panel B illustrates that only over-employed women who
are dissatis¯ed with their working hours left to early retirement involuntarily. This illustrates
the importance of using hours satisfaction measures when analyzing over-employment. If we
were to use only a dummy for being over-employed, the prevalence of over-employment would
be over-estimated. Finally, panel C suggests that only dissatis¯ed women who are working
full-time feel `pushed' to leave the labor market early. This may be due to career concerns
which causes women working full-time to be reluctant to accept lower quality jobs. Women
working part-time, who may be less concerned with their career, adjust working hours (and
change jobs) more easily and therefore experience no `involuntary' labor market exit.
All in all, the results suggest that increasing working hours °exibility may prolong the
39Someone is de¯ned as willing to take up a new job if they are either actively looking for paid work or if
they are not looking right now but would like to have a paid job.
40Over-employment at the time of labor market exit increases the probability of preferring a new job by 10
percent.
21working lives of older workers. In particular, increasing °exibility which allows gradual retire-
ment via good-quality part-time jobs may be e®ective in increasing labor market participation
among older women. The recent abolition of the legal constraint on drawing a pension while
continuing to work with the same employer for workers with a de¯ned bene¯t occupational
pension system is likely to have contributed to more °exibility in working patterns, and as such
may have positive e®ects on older workers' labor market participation. On the other hand, the
de¯ned bene¯t character of these pension schemes may restrict the positive e®ect on the length
of working lives as workers may be reluctant to opt for a gradual retirement pattern (which is
often associated with lower wages (Ghent et al. (2001))) if their pension bene¯t depends on
¯nal salary.
6 Employment e®ects
The previous results have shown that the working lives of older female workers may be prolonged
if °exibility in working hours were to increase. In addition to the e®ects on labor supply at
the extensive margin, it is interesting to see whether an increase in working hours °exibility
would increase total labor supply of older workers over the working lives, i.e. in the intensive
margin. Increasing hours °exibility may prolong the working lives of the individuals who have
now left the labor force early due to over-employment. On the other hand, the labor supply
of over-employed workers may decrease if they have the opportunity to reduce working hours.
The net e®ect on total labor supply depends on the relative size of both e®ects.
Unfortunately, the data provide no information on the preferred reduction in working hours.
As a result, it is not possible to ascertain how many hours the over-employed would have worked
if they could have reduced working hours gradually. This section attempts to estimate the e®ect
of more °exibility in working hours on total labor supply in a rather explorative analysis by
comparing hours worked by the over-employed with hours worked by unconstrained workers.41
Figure 9 illustrates the distribution of the total number of hours worked by workers as of age
50.42 The total number of working hours is the cumulated number of hours worked per year
41Note that the results may be subject to selection bias since workers in full-time contracts are more likely
to be over-employed than individuals working part-time.
42More precisely, total lifetime labor supply is of interest. However, since workers are only followed from age
22until the year in which the worker leaves the labor market. In order to study the relationship
between over-employment and total labor supply, the ¯gure distinguishes between workers who
have experienced little or no spells of over-employment (i.e. less than 10 percent of their time
in the labor market as of age 50) and workers who have experienced more periods of over-
employment (more than 10 percent of the time). The ¯gure shows that males work more hours
on average in their working lives (as of age 50) than females do. Furthermore, it appears that
over-employment is associated with a larger number of total hours worked for older workers,
especially for women.43 This suggests that a shorter work life does not completely o®set the
additional number of hours worked by over-employed, therefore total labor supply is actually
higher in the presence of hours constraints. In addition, the net e®ect of increased hours
°exibility on labor supply may be negative due to the low number of over-employed who leave
the labor market relative to the number of over-employed who continue to participate in paid
employment. Each year only 4 percent of the female labor force retires, 43 percent of whom
is over-employed, while 29 percent of the female labor force is over-employed but continues to
participate on the labor market without reducing working hours. On average, women work
29 hours per week. When working hours °exibility is increased, total labor supply remains
una®ected if the reduction in weekly working hours among over-employed women equals about
1.6 hours per week.44 However, the actual average reduction in weekly working hours observed
among the over-employed who were successful in reducing their working hours was about 7
hours. Hence, total labor supply is expected to decrease when working hours become more
°exible.
To examine the e®ect of over-employment on total `lifetime' labor supply, the total number
of hours worked after the age of 50 at the time of labor market exit is regressed on the time
of being over-employed during this period (denoted as a fraction of the total period of labor
market activity after the age of 50).45 The explorative results from Table 10 suggest that
50 to retirement, the ¯gure shows total labor supply in this period, rather than over the total working life.
43For males, the di®erence is not signi¯cantly di®erent at a 5 percent level of signi¯cance.
44That is, 94.4 percent of over-employed women would reduce weekly working hours on average by 1.6 hours,
while the remaining 5.6 percent now continues to participate on the labor market working 27.4 hours per week
as well.
45This is a rather explorative analysis as the over-employment status is likely to be endogenous.
23the total number of hours worked increases if labor market withdrawal is postponed by one
year. Note that this e®ect is slightly larger for males as they are more likely to work full-time.
Over-employment signi¯cantly increases the labor supply of older women; but this does not
apply for men. This ¯nding corresponds with the results from the competing risks model,
which suggested that males could reduce working hours relatively easily. However, the previous
estimates also indicated that over-employed women may choose to leave the labor market early.
The question is therefore how over-employment a®ects total lifetime labor supply. In panel
B, the indicator for the age at which someone left the labor market is omitted from the set
of regressors. The results indicate that over-employment increases labor supply for women,
regardless of the timing of retirement. Note however that the coe±cient is slightly smaller
due to the negative correlation between being over-employed and the age of labor market exit.
Finally, panel C illustrates that the positive e®ects on total labor supply particularly hold
for over-employed women working full-time.46 Hence, the results suggest that the early labor
market withdrawal of over-employed women does not entirely o®set the additional number of
hours worked while being active in the labor market. Though far from being conclusive, the
results suggest that an increase in working hours °exibility is likely to have negative e®ects on
older women's labor supply.
All in all, increasing working hours °exibility, which has often been suggested as an in-
strument for increasing older workers' labor force participation in the UK (e.g. EFA (2001,
2002)), may be e®ective to increase older workers' labor supply in the extensive margin, but
probably not in the intensive margin. Increasing the state pension age, as has recently been
announced (Van de Coevering et al. (2006)), may be more e®ective in increasing older workers
labor supply. Note that caution in interpreting the results is required. It would be interesting
to see how the results are a®ected if accurate information about the desired change in working
hours were to be present. Furthermore, matched worker-¯rm data may shed more light on
hours constraints, as it allows a comparison to be made of working hours and labor mobility
for workers in the same ¯rm. This is left for future research.
46Here over-employment is denoted in the share of total time worked in part-time and full-time jobs, respec-
tively.
247 Conclusions
Faced with workforce ageing, most OECD countries have to deal with the challenge of reversing
the trend of early labor market exit to prevent future labor shortages. Flexible working hours
have been widely supported as an important policy instrument to increase older workers' labor
supply, though little evidence exists concerning their e±cacy. This paper examines how working
hours constraints a®ect the decision to continue working or to leave the labor market for older
workers in the UK. Using a competing risks framework, the results indicate that over-employed
men can freely adjust working hours with their current employer. Over-employed older women,
though, leave the labor market earlier due to a lack of gradual retirement opportunities with the
current employer. This is especially true for women working full-time. Since women working
part-time may be less concerned with a lower quality bridge job, they may be able to adjust
hours more easily. These results suggest that more °exible working hours could prolong the
working lives of older women. However, the study provides some explorative evidence that
total labor supply of older workers would actually be lower if hours were more °exible: the
increase in labor supply due to prolonged work is cancelled out by a reduction in working hours
of the over-employed workers. Hence °exibility in working hours does not seem to be a suitable
instrument for dealing with the challenge of workforce ageing, as has often been suggested.
Possibly, increasing the o±cial retirement age as was recently suggested is more e®ective in
increasing older workers' total labor supply. However, if the participation of older workers on
the labor market is more important than their actual contribution in terms of working hours,
increasing possibilities for gradual retirement in good-quality jobs may be desirable. It is left
for future research to quantify the e®ect of hours constraints on the total number of hours
worked by older workers.
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29Table 1: Table of means
Males Females
O U All O U All
Over-employment (%) 100.0 0.0 43.0 100.0 0.0 36.4
Weekly working hours 40.7 38.6 39.5 35.3 25.3 29.0
Age 54.9 55.0 55.0 53.5 53.8 53.7
Local unemployment rate (%) 5.4 5.6 5.5 5.0 5.7 5.4
Married (%) 90.3 88.1 89.1 80.0 81.3 80.8
Spousal working hours 17.0 17.3 17.2 19.9 17.0 18.1
Tenure (years) 12.3 11.8 12.0 10.8 10.9 10.9
Gross hourly wage 10.1 9.9 10.0 8.2 6.3 7.0
Gross monthly non-labor income 106.1 117.9 112.8 65.5 84.2 77.4
Temporary job (%) 43.1 40.7 41.7 46.7 40.5 42.8
Working overtime (%) 54.2 50.6 52.1 41.6 32.0 35.6
Job satisfaction (1 ¡ 7) 5.0 5.5 5.3 5.2 5.9 5.6
Employer pension scheme (%)
Member 74.7 70.5 72.3 66.6 43.8 52.1
Not a member 9.8 9.9 9.9 12.9 19.1 16.9
No scheme o®ered 15.5 19.6 17.8 20.5 37.1 31.0
Education level (%)
No quali¯cation 26.7 29.6 28.3 22.0 35.0 30.2
Lower quali¯cation 9.3 7.0 8.0 8.9 9.1 9.0
Medium quali¯cation 20.1 23.6 22.1 32.1 32.7 32.5
High quali¯cation 43.9 39.8 41.6 37.0 23.2 28.3
Health (%)
Poor 3.5 3.7 3.6 5.3 5.4 5.4
Fair 21.5 16.5 18.7 19.2 17.1 17.8
Good 75.0 79.8 77.7 75.5 77.5 76.8
N 2149 2832 4981 1820 3109 4929
Note: 'O' refers to over-employed workers; 'U' refers to unconstrained workers.
30Table 2: Transition matrix of being hours constrained (%)
Hours constrained at t+1 Leave labor force
Unconstrained Over-employed
Hours constrained Same Employer Same Employer Retired Inactivity
at t employer change employer change
A. Males
Over-employed 23.0 3.4 54.5 4.9 4.4 2.8
Unconstrained 57.2 6.7 18.6 2.1 4.9 2.7
B. Females
Over-employed 19.0 4.3 57.5 4.4 4.5 2.5
Unconstrained 64.9 5.2 13.1 1.4 3.0 3.3
Note: Row percentages; sum is not 100 percent, since hours constraints in the next period are un-
observed for workers who are no longer observed in the survey the next period. Retirement refers
to the ¯rst time people report being retired, whereas inactivity refers to the ¯rst time people report
being unemployed, disabled or otherwise inactive. Chi-squared tests for independence indicate that
the hours constraints at t + 1 for under-employed workers at t are signi¯cantly di®erent at the 1%
level from those of over-employed workers at t.
31Table 3: Hours change and age of labor force withdrawal
Change in working hours Exit age
Stay Hours reduction Employer change: Retired Inactivity
with employer Fewer hours Same/more hours
A. Males
Over-employed 0.5 -5.5 -6.4 0.2 59 55
Unconstrained 0.6 -4.9 -5.1 2.5 60 55
N 3468 675 199 279 215 145
B. Females
Over-employed 0.2 -6.2 -6.8 0.6 56 54
Unconstrained 0.7 -4.3 -6.5 2.1 57 53
N 3557 666 177 233 163 133
Note: Retirement refers to the ¯rst time people report being retired, whereas inactivity refers to the ¯rst
time people report being unemployed, disabled or otherwise inactive.
32Table 4: Competing risks model - Males
Hours Employer change:
Retirement Inactivity reduction less same/more
with empl. hours hours
A. Baseline model (Log L = -4653.382)
Over-employment ¡0:027 (0:164) ¡0:051 (0:189) 0:263 (0:088)¤¤ 0:058 (0:150) ¡0:263 (0:139)¤
Unemployment rate 1:667 (3:193) 11:297 (3:182)¤¤ 0:034 (1:977) ¡6:920 (3:290)¤¤ 1:298 (3:090)
Working overtime ¡0:314 (0:149)¤¤ ¡0:118 (0:186) ¡0:504 (0:092)¤¤ 0:757 (0:169)¤¤ ¡0:520 (0:135)¤¤
Work hours spouse ¡0:015 (0:005)¤¤ ¡0:005 (0:006) 0:002 (0:003) ¡0:007 (0:005) 0:003 (0:004)
Gross hourly wage 0:021 (0:009)¤¤ ¡0:033 (0:035) ¡0:013 (0:010) 0:006 (0:013) 0:001 (0:009)
Employer pension scheme
Member 1:077 (0:282)¤¤ ¡0:139 (0:242) ¡0:007 (0:131) ¡0:292 (0:196) ¡0:246 (0:166)
Not a member ¡0:059 (0:431) ¡0:549 (0:390) ¡0:060 (0:176) ¡0:409 (0:295) ¡0:260 (0:227)
Health
Poor health 1:043 (0:381)¤¤ 1:257 (0:313)¤¤ 0:183 (0:264) 0:226 (0:439) 0:032 (0:406)
Good health ¡0:140 (0:196) ¡0:503 (0:206)¤¤ ¡0:017 (0:116) 0:236 (0:210) 0:089 (0:176)
Baseline hazard
51-52 0:710 (0:649) ¡0:097 (0:342) ¡0:164 (0:157) ¡0:425 (0:241)¤ ¡0:062 (0:242)
53-54 1:141 (0:644)¤ 0:426 (0:334) ¡0:015 (0:156) ¡0:160 (0:249) 0:232 (0:236)
55-56 2:048 (0:614)¤¤ 0:266 (0:360) ¡0:067 (0:167) ¡0:020 (0:252) 0:327 (0:244)
57-58 2:207 (0:625)¤¤ 0:488 (0:377) 0:256 (0:171) ¡0:346 (0:310) 0:391 (0:280)
59-60 3:334 (0:612)¤¤ 0:427 (0:394) 0:201 (0:190) ¡0:210 (0:364) 0:431 (0:291)
61-62 3:136 (0:624)¤¤ 0:622 (0:430) 0:204 (0:210) ¡0:104 (0:401) 0:199 (0:370)
63-64 4:876 (0:619)¤¤ ¡0:634 (0:792) 0:049 (0:276) 0:321 (0:476) 0:202 (0:481)
B. Including unobserved heterogeneity (Log L = -4635.223)
Over-employment ¡0:007 (0:166) ¡0:078 (0:203) 0:270 (0:092)¤¤ 0:050 (0:154) ¡0:291 (0:146)¤¤
Intercept (r=1) ¡3:846 (0:846)¤¤ ¡3:849 (0:937)¤¤ ¡1:257 (0:372)¤¤ ¡1:591 (0:623)¤¤ ¡0:664 (0:549)
Intercept (r=2) ¡4:005 (0:922)¤¤¡10:004 (1:961)¤¤ ¡2:640 (0:690)¤¤ ¡6:228 (3:975) ¡3:065 (2:176)
Intercept (r=3) ¡9:974 (1:460)¤¤ ¡2:776 (1:036)¤¤ ¡7:252 (0:686)¤¤ ¡1:137 (0:657)¤¤ ¡0:384 (0:565)
C. Including hours satisfaction information (Log L = -4646.875)
Over-employment:
- Satis¯ed ¡0:047 (0:188) ¡0:120 (0:235) 0:138 (0:107) ¡0:055 (0:190) ¡0:345 (0:183)¤
- Dissatis¯ed 0:014 (0:237) 0:037 (0:245) 0:411 (0:111)¤¤ 0:166 (0:180) ¡0:173 (0:176)
Note: Baseline estimations are based on 4,981 observations. The set of covariates include dummy variables for over-
employment, part-time work, temporary job, overtime hours, marital status, duration dependence, union coverage,
membership of employer pension scheme, job satisfaction indicators (pay, work itself and job security), education level,
industry, occupation, ¯rm size, and local unemployment rate, the number of hours worked by the spouse, tenure, real
gross hourly wage, real gross monthly non-labor income, and health indicators. Standard errors are in parentheses, a
**/* indicates that the coe±cient is di®erent from zero at a 5%/10% level of signi¯cance.
33Table 5: Competing risks model - Females
Hours Employer change:
Retirement Inactivity reduction less same/more
with empl. hours hours
A. Baseline model (Log L = -4282.344)
Over-employment 0:467 (0:195)¤¤ 0:270 (0:207) 0:035 (0:100) 0:305 (0:172)¤ ¡0:081 (0:153)
Unemployment rate 4:563 (3:881) 2:601 (3:907) ¡4:571 (1:875)¤¤ ¡7:797 (3:962)¤¤¡14:362 (3:144)¤¤
Working overtime ¡0:042 (0:188) ¡0:430 (0:226)¤ ¡0:289 (0:104)¤¤ 0:709 (0:172)¤¤ ¡0:234 (0:151)
Work hours spouse ¡0:008 (0:005)¤ 0:004 (0:004) ¡0:005 (0:002)¤¤ 0:002 (0:003) ¡0:002 (0:003)
Gross hourly wage ¡0:003 (0:025) ¡0:107 (0:041)¤¤ ¡0:024 (0:018) 0:014 (0:026) ¡0:004 (0:019)
Employer pension scheme
Member 0:899 (0:271)¤¤ ¡0:451 (0:275) ¡0:096 (0:136) ¡0:714 (0:224)¤¤ ¡0:121 (0:210)
Not a member 0:513 (0:313) ¡0:439 (0:276) ¡0:059 (0:145) ¡0:722 (0:263)¤¤ ¡0:325 (0:245)
Health
Poor health 0:441 (0:344) 1:207 (0:302)¤¤ 0:342 (0:229) 0:142 (0:408) 0:327 (0:362)
Good health ¡0:415 (0:216)¤ ¡0:482 (0:218)¤¤ 0:177 (0:118) ¡0:245 (0:199) 0:291 (0:196)
Baseline hazard
51-52 0:889 (0:564) 0:282 (0:283) 0:085 (0:137) 0:325 (0:248) 0:046 (0:216)
53-54 1:351 (0:550)¤¤ ¡0:006 (0:311) 0:011 (0:141) 0:422 (0:240)¤ 0:216 (0:204)
55-56 1:567 (0:548)¤¤ 0:141 (0:328) ¡0:117 (0:156) 0:248 (0:277) 0:240 (0:232)
57-58 2:199 (0:545)¤¤ 0:162 (0:364) ¡0:004 (0:162) ¡0:110 (0:360) ¡0:384 (0:309)
59 4:382 (0:542)¤¤ ¡0:014 (0:552) 0:266 (0:215) 1:034 (0:397)¤¤ ¡0:532 (0:570)
B. Including unobserved heterogeneity (Log L = -4272.541)
Over-employment 0:564 (0:265)¤¤ 0:254 (0:213) 0:016 (0:102) 0:303 (0:177)¤ ¡0:069 (0:157)
Intercept (r=1) ¡2:551 (1:207)¤¤ ¡2:743 (1:004)¤¤ ¡1:438 (0:407)¤¤ ¡2:335 (0:747)¤¤ ¡0:314 (0:835)
Intercept (r=2) ¡8:898 (2:016)¤¤ ¡1:357 (1:433) ¡1:420 (0:536)¤¤ ¡1:437 (1:080) 0:746 (0:669)
Intercept (r=3) ¡4:205 (1:786)¤¤ ¡4:171 (3:697) ¡4:680 (2:931) ¡2:680 (1:361)¤ ¡0:051 (0:712)
C. Including hours satisfaction information (Log L = -4277.137)
Over-employment:
- Satis¯ed 0:454 (0:220)¤¤ ¡0:051 (0:282) ¡0:104 (0:123) 0:205 (0:206) ¡0:069 (0:181)
- Dissatis¯ed 0:493 (0:260)¤ 0:660 (0:260)¤¤ 0:232 (0:129)¤ 0:435 (0:215)¤¤ ¡0:086 (0:208)
Note: Baseline estimations are based on 4,929 observations. For included covariates, see footnote Table 4. Standard

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Table 7: Sensitivity analyses - Males
Hours Employer change:
Retirement Inactivity reduction less same/more
with empl. hours hours
A. Working hours
Working full-time in ¯rst wave
Over-employment:
- Satis¯ed ¡0:049 (0:192) ¡0:120 (0:241) 0:122 (0:109) ¡0:066 (0:191) ¡0:399 (0:189)¤
- Dissatis¯ed ¡0:093 (0:240) 0:065 (0:252) 0:412 (0:113)¤¤ 0:166 (0:181) ¡0:195 (0:179)
B. Exclude exits to retirement and inactivity spells for shorter than 1 year
Over-employment:
- Satis¯ed 0:032 (0:198) ¡0:245 (0:328) 0:120 (0:103) ¡0:064 (0:183) ¡0:319 (0:148)¤¤
- Dissatis¯ed 0:166 (0:250) ¡0:066 (0:343) 0:409 (0:107)¤¤ 0:145 (0:174) ¡0:234 (0:149)
C. Long-tenure or -experience workers only
Tenure ¸ 5 years
Over-employment:
- Satis¯ed ¡0:019 (0:193) ¡0:155 (0:257) 0:173 (0:115) ¡0:004 (0:241) ¡0:667 (0:221)¤¤
- Dissatis¯ed 0:025 (0:245) ¡0:117 (0:285) 0:458 (0:121)¤¤ 0:330 (0:221) ¡0:364 (0:220)¤
Tenure ¸ 10 years
Over-employment:
- Satis¯ed ¡0:113 (0:254) 0:068 (0:323) 0:169 (0:153) 0:530 (0:367) ¡0:009 (0:351)
- Dissatis¯ed ¡0:093 (0:312) ¡0:331 (0:386) 0:373 (0:164)¤¤ 0:380 (0:393) 0:544 (0:342)
Experience ¸ 30 years
Over-employment:
- Satis¯ed ¡0:035 (0:188) ¡0:122 (0:239) 0:135 (0:110) ¡0:079 (0:198) ¡0:359 (0:187)¤
- Dissatis¯ed 0:037 (0:240) 0:091 (0:248) 0:395 (0:117)¤¤ 0:215 (0:189) ¡0:273 (0:188)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, a **/* indicates that the coe±cient is di®erent from zero at a 5%/10%
level of signi¯cance.
36Table 8: Sensitivity analyses - Females
Hours Employer change:
Retirement Inactivity reduction less same/more
with empl. hours hours
A. Working hours
Working full-time in ¯rst wave
Over-employment:
- Satis¯ed 0:668 (0:281)¤¤ ¡0:093 (0:383) ¡0:241 (0:142)¤ 0:140 (0:237) ¡0:025 (0:200)
- Dissatis¯ed 0:484 (0:328) 0:966 (0:355)¤¤ 0:152 (0:145) 0:383 (0:250) ¡0:052 (0:236)
Part-time vs. full-time
Over-employment:
- Satis¯ed - part 0:602 (0:379) 0:414 (0:380) 0:480 (0:213)¤¤ ¡0:103 (0:608) ¡0:052 (0:424)
- Satis¯ed - full 0:391 (0:274) ¡0:301 (0:383) ¡0:329 (0:138)¤¤ 0:195 (0:224) ¡0:109 (0:200)
- Dissatis¯ed - part 0:533 (0:496) 0:037 (0:630) 0:647 (0:275)¤¤ 1:050 (0:481)¤¤ ¡0:498 (0:644)
- Dissatis¯ed - full 0:475 (0:306) 0:796 (0:304)¤¤ 0:091 (0:139) 0:293 (0:234) ¡0:080 (0:211)
B. Exclude exits to retirement and inactivity spells for shorter than 1 year
Over-employment:
- Satis¯ed 0:440 (0:229)¤ ¡0:069 (0:347) ¡0:101 (0:122) 0:270 (0:202) ¡0:081 (0:162)
- Dissatis¯ed 0:095 (0:311) 0:639 (0:323)¤¤ 0:272 (0:127)¤¤ 0:486 (0:210)¤¤ 0:183 (0:177)
C. Long-tenure or -experience workers only
Tenure ¸ 5 years
Over-employment:
- Satis¯ed 0:352 (0:239) 0:021 (0:337) ¡0:146 (0:133) 0:458 (0:256)¤ ¡0:058 (0:240)
- Dissatis¯ed 0:494 (0:284)¤ 0:950 (0:299)¤¤ 0:120 (0:140) 0:334 (0:275) 0:142 (0:266)
Tenure ¸ 10 years
Over-employment:
- Satis¯ed 0:282 (0:301) 0:648 (0:427) ¡0:149 (0:171) 0:403 (0:362) ¡0:176 (0:494)
- Dissatis¯ed 0:612 (0:347)¤ 1:374 (0:513)¤¤ 0:280 (0:177) 0:034 (0:445) 0:728 (0:422)¤
Experience ¸ 30 years
Over-employment:
- Satis¯ed 0:346 (0:285) 0:108 (0:372) ¡0:047 (0:153) 0:183 (0:252) 0:040 (0:234)
- Dissatis¯ed 0:718 (0:321)¤¤ 0:751 (0:397)¤ 0:225 (0:182) 0:150 (0:284) ¡0:037 (0:285)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses, a **/* indicates that the coe±cient is di®erent from zero at a 5%/10%
level of signi¯cance.
37Table 9: Probit results job search of inactive individuals
Excluding u.h. Including u.h.
Males Females Males Females
A. Baseline model
Over-employed at exit 0:054 (0:125) 0:358 (0:157)¤¤ ¡0:007 (0:189) 0:410 (0:242)¤
Exit to inactivity 0:948 (0:142)¤¤ 1:022 (0:190)¤¤ 1:627 (0:229)¤¤ 1:742 (0:298)¤¤
B. Including hours satisfaction information
Over-employed:
- Satis¯ed 0:066 (0:147) 0:075 (0:189) 0:053 (0:233) ¡0:027 (0:324)
- Dissatis¯ed ¡0:046 (0:171) 0:573 (0:200)¤¤ ¡0:174 (0:243) 0:790 (0:294)¤¤
Exit to inactivity 0:934 (0:141)¤¤ 0:986 (0:188)¤¤ 1:644 (0:228)¤¤ 1:708 (0:300)¤¤
C. Part-time vs. full-time
Over-employed:
- Satis¯ed - part - 0:061 (0:313) - ¡0:312 (0:525)
- Satis¯ed - full - 0:084 (0:207) - 0:126 (0:382)
- Dissatis¯ed - part - 0:090 (0:296) - ¡0:009 (0:650)
- Dissatis¯ed - full - 0:676 (0:227)¤¤ - 0:956 (0:317)¤¤
Exit to inactivity - 0:973 (0:186)¤¤ - 1:694 (0:299)¤¤
Note: All estimations include a dummy for exit to inactivity, dummies for marital status and employ-
ment status of the spouse, age of labor market exit, duration out of employment, health measures,
age, gross monthly non-labor income, education level, local unemployment rate and an indicator for
over-employment status at the time of labor market exit. Standard errors are in parentheses, a **/*
indicates that the coe±cient is di®erent from zero at a 5%/10% level of signi¯cance.
38Table 10: Total number of hours worked
Workers choosing for: Retirement Labor market withdrawal
Males Females Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Including exit age
Fraction of time
in over-employment ¡0:086 (0:316) 2:541 (0:475)¤¤ 0:209 (0:215) 2:426 (0:305)¤¤
Age of labor market exit 1:980 (0:046)¤¤ 1:496 (0:072)¤¤ 1:972 (0:031)¤¤ 1:431 (0:046)¤¤
B. Excluding exit age
Fraction of time
in over-employment ¡0:583 (0:926) 1:432 (0:855)¤ 0:283 (0:708) 2:164 (0:595)¤¤
C. Part-time vs. full-time
Fraction of time
in over-employment:
- In part-time jobs - ¡0:275 (1:276) - 0:552 (0:854)
- In full-time jobs - 1:897 (0:829)¤¤ - 2:921 (0:571)¤¤
Note: The dependent variable is the total number of hours worked, from age 50 to the age of labor market
withdrawal, divided by 1000. Labor market withdrawal includes exits to both retirement and inactivity.
All estimations include an indicator for the share of total working years someone has been over-employed,
a gender dummy, education level, health status, indicator for being a member of an employer pension
scheme, and an indicator for the number of years for which yearly working hours were not observed but
the individual was still active on the labor market. Standard errors are in parentheses, a **/* indicates
that the coe±cient is di®erent from zero at a 5%/10% level of signi¯cance.
39Figure 1: Average usual working hours per week and the
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Note: Working hours exclude overtime hours. Retirement is de¯ned as the ¯rst time workers report to be
retired.
40Figure 2: Optimal labor supply - weekly working hours and
retirement age  
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47Figure 9: Total number of hours worked (between age 50
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488 Appendix
Table A4.1: Relating unobserved to observed heterogeneity
Males Female
class 1 2 3 1 2 3
Over-employment 43.3 35.9 50.9 35.8 42.2 39.0
Part-time work 3.9 1.9 8.2 43.8 38.6 28.5
Unemployment rate 5.1 5.8 4.3 5.0 5.5 5.5
Married 87.9 91.7 92.7 80.3 81.1 84.2
Tenure (years) 12.2 10.0 14.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Gross hourly wage 10.1 9.4 10.7 6.9 7.6 7.5
Temporary job 53.5 42.2 44.5 55.8 46.0 33.3
Member empl. pension scheme 71.1 63.8 83.6 51.4 59.1 63.2
Satisfaction
Satis¯ed with pay 34.3 34.3 10.9 28.2 33.5 23.7
Satis¯ed with work itself 18.1 21.0 7.3 13.1 17.3 12.3
Satis¯ed with job security 28.5 34.0 17.3 18.5 22.7 14.9
Age
50-54 54.0 38.1 36.4 64.4 59.4 48.7
55-59 31.3 42.9 38.2 35.6 40.6 51.3
60-64 14.7 19.0 25.5 - - -
Firm size
1-9 15.0 21.3 17.3 21.6 15.1 23.2
10-49 24.4 21.3 10.0 36.3 37.1 34.2
50-99 12.4 20.3 9.1 9.9 11.9 10.1
100-199 10.9 11.7 12.7 8.9 10.4 11.4
200-499 17.6 9.5 28.2 9.7 10.9 9.2
500+ 19.6 15.9 22.7 13.6 14.6 11.8
Predicted exit rate
Retirement 4.3 5.3 1.9 3.5 2.4 3.3
Inactivity 3.0 1.8 3.2 2.5 3.8 1.7
Hours reduction with employer 14.1 9.0 5.5 13.7 14.0 8.8
Hours reduction by changing employers 4.2 1.5 4.5 3.3 5.0 3.6
Employer change (same/more hours) 5.7 3.5 6.4 4.2 7.5 4.9
N 3922 654 405 3128 1292 509
49